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In the Supreme Court
of the State llf Utah
Q. T. NHRPHERD,
J>faintif( and AJjlJrlfrmt, ).

vs.
No. 8549

~fAX

B. HOLBROOK and
BLAX< 'HI·~ C. HOLBROOK, his
wife,
JJr_fr11drmts nnd Respm1deuts.

)

BRIEF OF APPELLANT

This ras0 is lwfon· this Court on appeal from a jn<lgment of t lie District Court of the Fifth Judicial District
0f the Niah• of Utah, in and for \Iillard County, in favor
of tlw defell(lants and ag-ainst th0 plaintiff, in an action
Lried before tlt0 conrt sitiin~ without a jm·~·.

rrlw jn<lg-

ment of til(• trial court w:1s "that plaintiff takP notl1ing: by
his complaint and 1hat d0f01Hlants hnv0 and

n•<'O\"Pl'

!'rom

pia inti t"l' all ('o:-;t:-; of t hi:-: action.''
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Plaintiff commenced this action in claim and deliY.
ery to obtain possession of certain chickens, alleging a
special interest by reason of being the chattel mortgagee
under a chattel mortgage executed hy one Kennetli E.
Barker and his wife on January 1C>, 195:2.

Defendants

elaim title to the chickens under a sales contract dated
.] an nary 18, 1950, which

the~,

propert~,,

only as_ to the real

claim to be conditional not
as to which there is no dis-

pute, but also as to the chickens involYed in this eontro\'ersy, ·which plaintiff Yigorously disputes.
STATR~IEXT

OF FACTR

On Jan nary 18, 1950, defendants and respondents
entered into a \Yritten agreement (Ex. 1) with l{enncth
1~.

Barker and his wife whereby the

Holbrook~

sell and the Barkers agreed to buy certain real
::\Lillard ( \mnty, 1Ttah, together with 8181
other personal

propert~-.

agreed to
e~tarc

chicken~

in

and

Only chickens are involved in

i hi~

cmlh'O\'Pr~~'·

t•rt~,

worth a pproximatel~' three-fourths of the purchase

price

a~

The Barkers turned over other prop-

a down payment. (Tr. 63, R. 79).

So far a~ pertinent to the i:-;~ IH'~ of thi:-; cast'. the

.\gTePnwn1 hehn,en Holbrooks and BarkPr;:-; can he
marir,ed

:t::-~

~um

follow::-;:

1. That e X<'<'J din.~- for a ::--~1 ipula ted n1iuinnnn, the halmwe of tlw pnrelw::-;c price should he paid out of
''net inconlP.'' ( ~et' Paragraph i~ of the ~\gn.'L'

nwut).
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2. ''X et Income'' is defined in Par. 4 of the Agreement.
3. The Barkers were to maintain at all times approximately 8000 chickens on the farm.

And, respecting any title retaining provisions, the
follow1ng paragraphs are quoted:

"17. The Sellers on receiving the payments
herein reserved to be paid at the times and in the
manner mentioned agree to execute and deliver to
the Buyers a good and sufficient Warranty Deed
conveying title to the real estate described in paragraph 1 hereof free and clear from any encumbrance ... and to deliver an Abstract of Title showing a good and marketable title in the Sellers except as provided in this paragraph.''
"16. In the rv0nt of a failure to comply "With
the terms hereof by the Bu~·c•rs, or upon failure to
make an~- payments "when the sam<> shall ht·c·omc·
due, or within 60 days thereafter, the NPllPrs ~dwll,
at their option, he released from all ohligatiom; in
la\v and equit~· to ron\·e~· said propert~· and all payments whieh ha v<• lH•<•n made t h<•rPtof'on• on this
<'nni nH't h~· the Bn~·ers shaH lH• fori' Pi t<•d to the NPllf'rs as liquidated damages for the non-perforn1ance
of the contract, and the Bu~·0rs agTP<' that the NP1l
c•rs may, at th0i r option, r<•-<•nt<•r and take poss<'i-1:-;ion of said pn·mis(•s without legal pro(•(•:-;:-; as in
its first and former estate, tog-<•tlJ<•r with all im-·
prm·<·m<·nh..; and additions mad<· h~- thP Bu:·c•rs
thereon, and the sai<l additions a11<\ imprm·<·nw11ts
shall remain vvith tho land and h<·<·om<· t!H· JH'OJ wri.'
of tlw N<·llers, tlw Bny<•rs becoming· at OIH'<' a i<·nant at will of the Se1l0rs. It is ngT<'e<l th<~t tim0 is
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the c•ssenec> of this AgreenH'nt.''
The Agreement has no title retaining provisions
other than as quoted, and makes no provision whatever
respecting increase or replacements of chickens.
The Barkers went into possession of the real and personal property and commenced the egg· and chicken business.

They experienced financial difficulties to the end

that Barkers became indebted to plailltiff for poultry
feed and sundry supplies to the extent of $4750.00 (Tr.
:>4-;)7, R. 70-73).

Shortly prior to Jan nary V). HfJ:2, the

plaintiff told the Barkers that he wanted a note secured
by a chattel mortgage ( Tr ..);), R. 71) and after negotiations the Barkers did on January 15, 19;5:2, gi \·e plaintiff

a promissory note in that sum, secured by a chattel mort~!;a,g·e

(Tr. 57, H. 73) on 7300 chickens (Ex. :2) aiHl-''Together with all incrl'ases and replacements
of an;; of sai(l ehickens."
~ ilH'P

ti tlc to

increa~t>

and

replacement~

in this rasP it nw:--· be well to state at
•·rs under the .\gT('PllWlJt received

thi~

~181

is invoh·ed

point that Barkchickens; thctt at

the 1inw plaintiff took his mortgage only 1000 of the

uri~

]nnl <'hi<'b'lls rc>mainecl on the pn'mist>s (Finding of Fact
~ o.

21) ; that at 1ht' time den1and

\\·a~

made on Holbrooks

for possPssion ol' tlw chickens involvt>d in this action, Hone
of tlw original

chicken~

remained ( rrr.

~:~.

R. 99) and that

at. stt<'h timP all of tlw ..t-000 rhickens on the premist's \Yere
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rcplacemenh; ('rr. H:l-H+, H. 99-100).
Thereafter the plaintiff on the faith of the note and
chattel mortgage extended further credit to: :the Barkers
to the extent of approximately $3200.00. Being himself
in need of money, he preYailed on Barkers to borrow that
Hum of a bank and indorsed th<.• Barker not<' which Barker did n__ot pay.
Barkers paid only $;)()8.\lO in reclnetion of his nqte to
the plaintiff (Tr.1:2; R. :2H) and on or about the 29th day
of September, 19i>.), commenced this action to recover immediate possession of the chickens ancf to foreclose his
chattel mortgage.

At that time Barkers were indebt-

eel to plaintiff in a sum in rxeess of $8,000.00 including

the hank note whieh plaintiff indorsed and which Barker
<lid not pay.
Prior to the romm('ll('('lllent of this aC'tion the Holhrooks eommenced au action to reposs<.•ss the property
l'm'ered hy the Agreement with Barker, siuee Barker had
(1efaulted.

In the <·ours<· of that litigation the Holbrooks

and Barkers s<·ttled t1H_•ir difficulties by some payment
from Holbrooks to Barkprs (Tr. lOG, R. 1:2:2) and po...,s<·s·
~'ion

of tlw r<'al prop<:rty and 4000 chickens (Tr. 108, H.
n·pla(·(•mc~nts alH1 not any of tlw original

] 24), whieh ,,·t·n·

(•hirlwns,

,,·as

g·i \"<•n to tlw Holhrooks.

tiff k1ww of th<' aetion

l~!•h\'<'<'11

A Ithoug-h phi in-

Holbrooks awl

Bark<~rs

he was not a party to it.
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STATEMENT OF ERRORS RELIED OX
The errors relied on by the plaintiff for a reversal
of the judgment of the trial court can be stated as follm;,·s:
1. The Sellers, respondents herein, did not retain
title to qhickens purchased hy the Buyer~ to replace those
ehickens comprising the 8181 chickens which had been
culled out or had died.

II. Title to the original 8181 chickens passed from
the Sellers to the Buyers upon execution of the Agreement dated January 18, 1950.
III. The Court erred in admitting into eYidence testimony by l\Ir. Barker as to his understandings of various words and provisions of the Agreement of January
18, 1950, because the testimony wa~ inadmissable under
the standard of interpretation to be applied in determinmg the meaning of the contract.
IY. The admission of certain tc>stimony of Barker
and ~I r. and ~f rs. Holbrook Yiolatecl the Parol E,·idence
Hule.
Y. The AgTN•nwnt gan' the Buyers the rig·ht to

~ell

tlw chiekPns and the> SellPrs cannot therefore object to
t liP appellant's m.ortg:tg't' whieh was gi n•n for Yalue .
.ARG r

1

~fEX1

I.
The Sellers, respondents herein, did not retain title to
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chickens purchased by the Buyers to replace those chickens
comprising the 8181 original chickens which had been culled
out or had died.

The chickens ·which the> appellant sought to reeoY<·r
in this action

b~~

virtue of his chattel mortgage "\H'l'e n·-

placemeuts of the 8181 originals.

The mortgage was

g-iven hYo years after the Agreement had been executed
and at that time not more than 1000 of the original 8181
birds remained (Finding of F1 act Xo. 21).

And at the

time appellant commenced this action, none of the original hens remained.

...\11 had been replaced hy younger

birds. This fact is extremely significant in this case and
·cannot b8 over-emphasi7.ed.

It is appellant's contention

that C\'C'll though this t 'ourt should hold that title to the
original 8181 chickens \Vas retained by the sellers as sC>c:nrit~·

for the balance of the unpaid purchase price, h:'

no means can the agreement be inh·rpn·tc•d to als;J admit
of the seller's retaining title to the replaeemc·n1s.

appellant

m·.~·r·s,

dearly in the

Thus,

tith• to the replacement C'hiC'kc·ns \\'as

lm~·<·rs

<m<l t ]J(':"' wen• fn•e 1o <'Xt><'llt i' to

the appellunt a goc<l elmtt<·l mortgage on them.

Appel-

lant's elHttt!·l mortga:.!Y was c•xpn•ssl:' made to exh•ll<l to
inen·as<· aiHl n·plac·c·m(>llis and tlt<·n· can h<' no qnPst ion
but wlwt it eo\·<'n·<l the e1Ji('k<'11S possPs:·w<l h:· 11H· ~l·llr.•rs
(respondents ll<·rein) :d tlH• i ime this ac·tion W<ts comrn<·m~<'d.
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1ng replacements in conditional sales contracts.

Huw-

cver, the same rule should apply as in cases of chattel
mortgages since both are security devises used in the ::;ale
of personal property. The rule governing replacements
in chattel mortgages is well stated at 10 Am. Jur., Sec.
133, Page 802:
''Whether a mortgage of a stock of goods covers additions and substitutions thereafter made in
the ordinary course of business depends on the intention of the parties as gathered from the language
of all parts of the agreement, considered in relati0n
to each other and interpreted ·with reference to Lle
situations of the parties, and their objects, unless
some established principle of law or sound public
policy would thereby be violated. The inlrntiu;, tu
corrr additions mul suhstitutious must be rlearly
r':YpressPd in the instrument in order to charg·e persons dealing with the stock vYith notice of that fact,
and it has been held that, as a rule, the mortgage.
must e.rpressly proride that it is to corPr additiou.;.;
or substitutions wherr> the rights of third jJr>r.-.·11/S
are i11rnlred." (Italics added).
That 1hr intrnt to include replaerments or after-ac(}nirrcl proprrt~· must hr clearly C'XJn·essed in the instrulnrnt (ser .lnJ/I'S on Clwttel J!ortgag(·s & Cond. Soles, Gth
g<l., NP('.

17:~a.

and the

.,+Idaho :-109, !l-t. Pac.

followi.n~.!,· cases:

+~1.

Ryan r. Roger.-. .

1916 D .:\nn. Cs.

1~17: Cuuniii[J-

liaJ/1 r. ~llryo11 1roole11 .llills, 69 X .•T. Eq. 710,61 A. li:2:

P . .!. Rlark l.ilflllhl'r Co. r. Turk, .)0 \Y~·o. 361, G~ P. ~d 510:
and l11 rf' ThnJ11pso11, 16-t- Towa :20, 1-t-.) X. \r. 7G, 1~116 n.
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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Ann. ( ~s. 1210.

In the last cited case the court stated that

in Iowa
"a pnrt.\' ma~· h~- express terms mortgage, and
his mortgage 111<:1~· be made to cover, not only stock
in existence, but additions and substitutions thereafter made in the ordinary course of business . . .
But the intent to do so mm~t be clearly e.rpressed in
the mortgage, so as to charge persons dealing vvi t h
the stock with notice of that fact.'' (Italics added).
The court eitc•d with apprO\'al an excerpt from

.lo111'.<..'

on elwttel J1ortgages, 4-th Ed.,· Sec. 154-, wherein it is
~tated

h,v'

in substance that new goods which arl' acquired

wa~'

of renewal of old goods, or in substitution for

them, or which are paid for out of thL• proceeds of old
goods, are not brought under t lw mortgage

nnle~s

the

intent to do so he elt>arly shown.
The eontraet of .Ltnllar:; 18, 19,)0, ean be seardwd in
Yain for an:-: elcar express provision or any provision
that the sc·lkrs \\'<•n• to holu titlt> to the ehi<'kt>ns brought
upon the farm as r('phH·c·m(•ntf; of the 8181 originals. Fndcr the rule of the above· cited c·as<•s, the sPllPrs did nul
have title to tlw replacements.

Tit](• to all repl<H·Prnt>Hls

remained in Barkers as the pur<'hasc•rs of the replcH'l'
ments from third pc•rso11s.

vVhen tlw parties drafted

and exeeuted the J\.'!,T<•<•nwnt of .January 18, UJ.)O, t1tC'~
lJad it w~>ll in mind that the original 8181 rhiek(•11s woul(l
he r('placcd from time to time by

,\'Ollll!.!,'Pl'

hirds hecanRI'
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they provided that the buyers should operate the farm in
an "efficient, economical and husbandlike

m~nner"

and

the r_ecord is replete with testipwny of all parties and
witnesses that it was necessary to replace chickens for
such an operation.

Yet it is significant that they studi-

ously avoided putting into their agreement any provision that title to the replacement birds should be held
hy the sellers as security.

They went so far as to pro-

·•ide that approximately 8000 chickens should be kept
on the farm at all times knowing that in a short time
all would be replacements, but made no provision that
title to such replacements should be held by the sellers.
Plaintiff is confident that this Court knows that customarily chattel mortgages specifically cover increase
and replacements where that is the intention of the
lender and borrower, and equally it is true that contracts make such specific pro'dsion where the parties
netnnl!.{.- intend that title to increase and replacemeuts
:-:honld he

111

the seller.

There

~~

a logical rt>as(m or explanation ,,·hy the

.\gTPement did not so

proYide.

Barkers

had

paid

three-fourths of the purchase price or had traded land to
tJwt valne (Tr.
thought
j

the~·

-+-+-~-.\

R. nO-ol).

The Holbrooks we-re, or

wen', well secured h:· the title retaining- fea-

nres of the AgTeement in connection with real property.

The pro,·isiou respecting· the maintaining· of 8000 chick1'11:-;

at all tim<>s wa:-; norp:-::-;ary in order that Barkers· net
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·ll

income would be sufficient to l>HY out the balance, but
certainly does not have title-retaining features.

A pro-

vision similar to the above-mentioned provision of the
Agreement was construed by the court in Phillips 1.:.
Rootlt, ;)8 Iowa '"Hlfl,
1:2 X. \Y. 481. The <'ollrt, after not.. :'
ing that the mortgage did not <·xpr~·~sl~- proYide tha_t fu..~

ture acquisitions to stock should he held as

inclnde~l

1n

the mortgage, f-ltatPd:

_

"Tt is true, it (the mort.!!;ag·p) refers to a stoek
of boots and f;hoes and clothing but it also schedules
and clef-lrrilws the mortgaged goods. There \\'ere no
g·oods mortgaged excepting such as arc selwdttlt•d
because the languag·c is t.hat it is the propPrt.v <1escribed in the followin_g· srheclnle. It may he that
the parties intended to include future acquisitions
of goo<ls. The provision that the mcn;tgagor should
keep up the stock would seem to indicate something
in that direction. But this is not a proceeding to
rc•form the mortgage and we mus_t take it as it reads.
;i \V e eannot extend its provision, nor ·find hy infercnee ·what was intended. The rule allowing propcrt~' to he mortg·ag·<·<1 whieh is not yd in lwing·, or
not owned h~- the mortgagor has in our opinion lw<•n
extended quite far enough without allowing· it to
he donP hy m<·rr· infc>rP1H'<'. ''

.Tones in his 1r<•atis<'
Sales, Gth Ed.,

011

('hattd Jlorf_r;rl,rJr·s

~ec. 11:~<1, stat<·s

'There· h<·in_'-',· no elear

the law to the

(~xpn•ssion

ol'

&

('oJifl.

s;llll!'

t'i'F<•d.

inlPllt

in 111('

AgTec·nwnt that tli(• seilerR should hold title to the re-

plae<·m.Pnt ehiek<'llR, aR rP<)'nirecl h~' th<~ nho\'<' ant.hori1i(•:-;,
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it follows that the sellers, respondents herein, cannot
claim title to the replacement chickens.
II.

Title to the original 8181 chickens passed from the Sellers
to the Buyers upon execution of the Agreement dated January
18, 1950.

An examination of the Agreement of January 18,
1950, entered into between the Holbrooks, as sellers, and
the Barkers, as buyers, discloses that it was the intention
of the parties that title to the personal property described in the Inventory attached thereto (which includes
8181 chickens) should pass from the sellers to the buyers
npon the execution of that agreement. The Agreement
will not admit of a construction that title to the personal
property should be retained by the sellers until the purchase price had been paid in full, as \Yas their intention
rrsrweting· the real P:-~tate. In Paragraph 17 of that
Agreement it is proYided that title to the real estate
Rhonld he conYcycd upon payment of the purchase price

in full:
"17. Thr ~t'llPrs on recei,·ing the pa~nwnt:-;
herein n•sPrYPd to he paid at the times and in the
manner ahoYP mentioned agree to execute and deliver to t hl' Buyers a good mHl sufficient \Yarranty
DcPd conyp~·ing title to the real l':-;tatP dt>seribed in
parag-raph 1 lwreof free and clear from any Pll<'Ulllhr:tll<'P ... and to dP 1i Yrr an ~\ h:-;t r:1ct of Tit lP slwwSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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ing a good ancl markl'iable title in the ~eller~
cept as provided in this paragraph.''

PX-

There is no provision in the above paragraph or at
<m:, other place in the Agreement for the vesting of title

in the personal property in the lmyers upon tlH_•ir paying
the purchase price in full.

Had such been their intention,

it is reasonable to assume that in Paragraph 17 pro·dsion would have been made to that effect.

That the par-

ties <lid n_ot intend for the f-;c•llPr~ to retain title to Lhe
personal property is further borne out by the provi:..;ion~

of Paragraph 16 wherein it i~ proYidc<l:
"16. In tht• event of a failure to compl~· with
the term~ hereof h~' the Bu~'(>l's, or upon failure to
make> any payment~ when the ~arne shall become
due, or 'vithin 60 <lays thereafter, the Sell<>r~ shall,
at their option, be n·lva~<·d from all obligations in
law and Pqui t,\' to ('011 rr·y said property and all payments wh ieh ha v<~ lwPn made theretofore on this
rontrart 1>:· the Bu.\·<·r~ shall lH· forfeited to tht>
~(·ll<·rs as liqnidat<•<l dam~u.!,·es for the non-pprformmH·e of tl1P contract, and t l1P Bll,\'<'1'~ agTP<' tlwt llw
~<dl<·r:-: rna~', at th<·i r optio11, n·-r"Jtff'J' and tal·a~ po~
sc•ssion of said /)rrmi::;f's 'vithont legal proePss as in
it~ fir~t and former estat<•, tog;d.lwr with all improvements and addition~ made by th<' Bll.\'<'1'~
tlwreon, all<1 the sai<l addition:-; and improY<'lll('llb
shall remain with the lnnd and hP<·onw tl1P pro]H~rt:·
ofthe f-;c1lers, the Bnyprs l)(•<·oming- at mH·<· a ieuunl
at will of the ~<'ll<'rs. It is agT<'Pd tl1at tim<> i~ th<:
I'SS('Jl('l' of th)s ,\!_I,T<'<'ll"lt'llf." (Ttall<'S nd<lf><l).
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Note the choice of words in that paragraph which \re
have italicized:

''Convey,'' ''re-enter,''

''premises,''

"tenant." They could not more clearly be limited to real
property in their application. They are not words which
would be employed hy a draftsman who intended to affect personal property as well as real property.
is conspicuously absent from the Agreement

an:~

There
provi-

sion for the recovering of the personal property upon
the default of the lm:·er:-;.

Thus it can only be assumed

that the parties intended the :;.;ale of the personal property to be absolute, that title pass from the sellers to the
buyers upon the execution of the Agreement, and that the
default of the buyer:;.; would have no affect on the title to
the personalty. It should be remembered that the buyers
had made a dovn1 payment of approximately :% of the
value of the chicken ranch hy conyeyin,<.!_· to the

sell~..·rs

their farm in Korth Ogden (R. 60, Tr. -!-l-). and it is not
unnatural in Yiew of that large down payment that the
sPllPrs felt sufficiently :-;eenre in retaining only the title
to the real Pstntt> and allowing the title to the

pcr~onal

property to pass at the timc> of the exrcntion of the .Ag-rt>C'm<>n t.

If therc> he any donht as to the intent of the pnrtit•s
<>xpr<>:-;s(•<l in tlH' AgTt>t•mt>nt as to when title to the per:-;onal propert:· passe(l from thP st•llPrs to the lm:••t•rs, rc~ourse should then he n1ade to 8('1'8. fi0-:2-:2 and ()·o-:!-.·;
{"fnll (Yod<' .I 1111. 19:iH,

wherein it is proYidt•d:
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60-~-~- " ( 1) \Vhen• there is a contract to sell
specific or ascertained goods, the property in them
is transferred to the buyer at such time as the parties to the· contract intended it to be transferred..
"(~) For the purpose, of ascertaining the iuLention of the partie•;.; regard shall be had to the terms
of the contract, the conduct of the partie~, 11sages
of trade and the circumstances of the case.''

60-2-3. "Fnless a different intention appears,
the follovting are rules for ascertaining the intention of the parties as to the time. at which the propc>rt.'' in the goods is to pass to the lmyer:
.·
''Rule (1) \Vhere there is an unconditional
contract to sell specific goods in a deliYerable statt',
the property in_the goods passes to the hnyer when
the contract is made, and it is immaterial wlwtltt'l'
the time of pa~ment, or tlH• time of deliYer:·, or
both, is postponed.''

The 8181 c·Lickens dcsignatc•d 1n the inYc>ntor.'' ,\-ere
specific goods in a deliverable state and under the above
statutes title to them passed to the buyers at tl1<· time
the agreement was

si.~·ne(l,

tention manifested in tlH•

there being no different in-

A.!.!,TP('lll~'llt.

A n'c·ent emw strik-

ing!.'- similar to tlH' inshmt case in which the court n·lit><l
upon the above seetim1s of the l'niform Sales Act is floss
r. Orr, 3 X .•J. '277, 69 A. 2d 7:W.

There the plaintiff au<l

defendant en ~\fan~h 18, 1946, l'llt<·r<·d into a wriltPll
cl,!.!,Tcement for th(~ sal(' and purchase of a g·antg<' build;11!2,',

the land on which it stood, and all the

fH'r~onal

prup-

(rty then on the pn·mis<·s, <>Xe<'pt for a hydraulic jack.

Hig·ht of poss<·ssinn to the premis0s was g·in•n immccli-

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

lti

ately and payment and delivery of the deed was set for
on or before May 1, 1946. About two days after the execution of the agreement, but before the buyer had taken
actual possession of the premises, the personal property
was stolen. In a suit by the seller to recover the purchase
price of the personal property (which had been stated
8eparately in the contract) the buyer contended that under the agreement title to the personal property would
not pass until execution and deliYery of the deed and
payment of the purchase price for the real and

per~onal

~lay

1, 1!J46J

vroperty, which was to he on or before

Hence, defendant argued, title to the personalty was in
the seller on the date of the theft.

The trial court ui-

rected a Yerdict for the plaintiff on defendant's opening
statement, which ruling was upheld on appeal to the
preme Court of

~Pw

Jersey.

~u

The latter court in its

opinion, after acknowledging that the contract proYided
for the payment of the purchase price (of both the realty
and persona1t~-) simultaneously with the deliYery of the
deed on ~[a~- 1, l!l-W, said:
'• Although tinw of paynwnt for the personal
property was postponed h~- the proYisions of the
agreenw11t. there was no expression nPgatiYing the
statuton· presumption of passag'l• of title when the
<•OJI1t'a<·1 was sigHPd.
'• If, aftt>r 'n•ighing the language employed in
111<> contract, doubt still (•xists as to the interpretation of it, tiH•n, mulPr th0 statute, we turn to thl'
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'conduct of the parties' and the 'circumstances of
the case' as there provided, 'for the purpose of ascertaining the intPntion of the parties'. (citing· X .
•J. statute identical to 60-2-2, U.C.AI 1953) ...
'• ... Giving the defendants the benefit of l'Vel"y
douht and assuming no inference as to their intent
can be spelled out either by contract or hy their conduct, then the statutes apply unless the contract expresses 'a different intention'. (citing X. J. statute
identical to 60-2-3, U.C.A. 1953) ... lTnder the statute set forth above, the property in the goods passed
to the buyers when the contract was made unless a
different intention appears and it is imnmterial
whether time of payment or the time of delivery or
hoth be postponed.
"\Vas tlwre anything in the contract to indieate a different intention'! It is asserted such a
contrary design appears in the provision for the
later conveyance of title to the real l•statl•, but the
contract deals with realty and personalty as spparat~ and distin(·t transactions and there is no spPcific provision that the general rule for the immediate transfer of personal property should not ap-ply. It is presumed th<' partiPs C'ontradl'd in light
of tlw statute and, if t hl'y had a purpose eont 1 a ry
to the legislati V<' enactment, tht-~' would hav<' expressed it in C'h·ar and unmistakahl<' langmu!;P.
~-,incling no such declaratio11, we conclude that the
statut<•s control and title pass<·d on thP datP the
eon tract waf-1 execnted.''
As in the a bon~ case, t h<'n· is nothing in tlw A.!!,'n'P-•
ment between the Holbrooks and the Barkers to sugg-Pst
that Rule 1 of See.

60-~-:~,

U.< ~.A. 1!1:>:~, should not apply.
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'.L'here is nothing to negatiYc the. statutory enactment
that title to personal property should pass immediately.
\Ve have already noted that the;re is nothing providing
for title to the personal property to pass simultaneously
with the title to the real property, and there isno proYiBion for allowing t~e sellers to retake the person~Hy in
case. of the default bf the ,buyers. Title to the personal
J)roperty, including th~ 8181 ch~ckens, therefore, passed
on January 18,. 1950, when the Agreement was executed.
It follQws that the buyers could give to the appellant a
valid chattel mortgag·e on what remained of the original
8181 chickens.
IIL
Th~

court erred in admitting into evidence testimony by

Nfr. Barker as t.:> his

und~rstanding

of

var~ous

words and pro-

visions of the Agreeme:1t of January 18, 1950, because the testimony was inadmiss.1ble under the standard of interpretation
to be applied in determining the meaning of the contract.

0\'Pr the ohjcrtion of counsel for the appellant, the

trial eourt allowed counsel for the respondents to elicit
from 1\f r. Barker, one of the buyer~. ·what his understanding:-; wPrP a:-; to whether under the Agreement (1) the
NPllerR retained an~' Ht'eluit~T for the balance of the

JHH-

ehaN<.' prieP ·(H. 61-n:~. Tr. -t-.>-47); (:2) whether the. word

"prPmi:-;p:-; '' in Paragraph 16 induded both land and
I'll iek<'HH (R. n:~. Tr. -fi) ; (

:n

the meaning- of 1he word
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''·property'' appearing 1n Paragraph 16 of the Agreement wherein it is provided that in case of default of the
lmyers, sellers shall have the option of being relieved of
all obligation to convey the "property" (R. 64-64, Tr.
48-49), and the meaning of the \H>r<l "premises" in said

paragraph; ( 4) his understandings of Paragraph 10 (R.
65-67, Tr. 49-51); ( 3) whether under the Agreement he

had the right to

se~l

the chickens and replace them with

younger hens (R. 66, Tr. 50); (6) how many chickens he
had the right to sell (R. (i/-69, Tr. 30-3:2).
In brief, the trial court permitted Barker and the
Holbrooks, while on the witness stand, not only to vary
the terms of a written contract by parol evidence, not only
to testify to their claimed understanding of it, not only
to interpret the meaning of words of legal import and
place tlwir own construction on the contract, but permitted them to acually re-write the entire contract according
to their own desires, and attempt to hind this plaintiff
who was not

C\'t'll

a

part~·

to it.

Parenthetically, it is ohs<>n·<><l that not

onl~·

an~

Points III and IV well tak<·n even though this were a suit
between the· parti<·s to the• Agreement, hut in this <·as<'
the parti<·s to the AgT<'<'In<'nt an· attt•mpting· to hind a
third person, this plaintiff .
. Appellant ('ont<'JHls that tlH· admission of tlt<>
te>stimmt~·

in

abon~

a]l(l th<' considerntion of it by tltt• trial court

int<·qn·<·tin.~·

t l1<·

AgT<·<>m<•nt constitutes reversil ll(•
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C'rror because the Agreement Is an integrated contract
and cannot be interpreted
~ng~

accor~ing

to the understand-

of the parties as to what its various provisions mean.

The Restatement of Co11fracts, Sec. 228, -defines as inte-

l.!Tation as follows:
''An agreement is int~grated where the parties thereto adopt a writing. or writings_ as the final
and complete expression of the agreement. An integration is the writing or ·writing-s so adopted."
Respondents havr. never contended

othen~.rise

than

that the Agreement of January 18, 1950, contain eli the
whole agreement between the Barkers and them.

':Pherc

Leing an integration, it was patently erroneous for the
trial court to allow Barker, one of the parties to that
integration, to

testif~T

as to what he understood variuus

words and provisions to mean. ThP Restatcmnlf of Cunlracts, f-Ire. 230, ~d~ fol.·th the standard to

lH!

used in in-

t<·rpr<.•ting· an intPg;rated contract:
',.rrhe stmHlard of interprPtation of an integration, t>x<·t•pt where it produees an c-unbignou::-; result, or is exduded hr a rule of law establishing a
clPfini t P mcanin !.!,', i::-; the n1eaning; that would be at·
tachrtl to the int.egrntion h~- a re'asonabl~- intelli~·C'11t
person aequaint<•d with all operative usages and
knowing all tlw ei relnnstanrPs prior to and eontenlporanrous with tlw making· of the intc·;!_Tation,
u/1/('/' tluw ()J"(/1 sfall'liii'Jtfs by fh(' parties of wliat
tlu·!t i11k11dl'd it to mca11 ... (Italics addt•<l).
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In comment (a) to the above section, it is stated:
'' . . . But oral statements by the parties of
what they intended th~ written language to mean
are excluded, though these statements might show
the parties goa ve their wonls a meaning that would.
not otherwise be apparent. Such a common understanding may justify reformation, but cannot be
the basis of interpreting an integration. So the
meaning given the words of a writing by a reasonably intelligent third person will be given them,
even though that meaning is not one that would be
anticipated by one par(f or the other.''
See also comment (b) to Section 230.

TV iii i.1dou

t)i1

flo11fratfs, Rev. Ed., Ser. 607, is in acrord with the abo,~e

rule of the Restatement.

This court in Erickson r. Bas-

fia11, 98 etah 587, 10:2 P. 2d 310, applied tlw RulP of :--,<·e.

230 to the integrated contract in that easP.
In Jliller r. 0. B. Jhr'li11for·k.

\Y.

7~4,

~10

:\finn.

1:>~, ~!17

K.

the court stated:

"The e>xdnsion of the stat<·mPni s and eonversations as to what the parties m<·:m1 h~' the lan.guag('
of tlw eontrad was eol'l'(•d. 11:\'i<l<'lH'<' of all (•ircumstances prior to and contemponuwous with the
PX(•(•ution of the (•ontnwt was admissable, hut oral
statements of the pa r1 iPs of what t h<·~' in1 <'lHled tlt1•
languag·e to mean wen• not.'' (('itin~· H.<•s1a1PmPn1
of Coni rads, SPr. ~~0).
The -:\filler rasP was ('ited with approval and the
ahove language ftUOted hy th(• court in Ohio

e it i.2'r'1/.\
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'l'rust

'~'·

Air-Way Eler:trir· App. eorJJ., 56 F:

~..;;npp.

1010.

-\gai:g- :·~A· Colvocore_ss~~ v. ,Wasse.rman Co., 38 Del. 253,
·tno A. 607, the court rc>lying upon Redion 2~0 of the Re~tatcmrnt

stated:

''Where, as in thif' case, the language of the
contract is not in any ·~ense ambiguous, its meaning
is or4inaril5; a question of law for the court to ascertain from the instrument itself, ·and allegations
as to:the intent of the parties with respect- to the
meaning of the words used, and whether such intent is shown by subsequent acts, or by the declarations of the parties, made at or about the time of
the execution of the contract, or otherwise, are usually of no import/' citing cases including Yalentine
Y. Shepherd, 1 :J Ariz. :.2-l-l; ] GS Pac. 648.
Tlw testinwny of Barker as to his understanding of
Yanou~

\\·onls and proYisions was clearly inadmissable

1wenns<• of

it~

immateriality in the interpretation of the

J\.greement and the trial court rrred in admitting such
t<>stimony into eYidence oYer the objection of counsel for
the appellant.
timon:~

~.\~ will b<.' seen under Point -IY, that tc~

\\·ns aJRo inadmissable under the Parol EYidence

H 11le.

IV.
The admission of certain testimony of Barker and Mr. and
Mrs. Holbrook violated the Parol Evidence Rule.
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It has been shown under Point III that the lower

court erroneously allowed into evidence, over the obJection of counsel for appellant, testimony by lVIr. Barker,
the buyer, as to what he understood certain terms and
provisions of the Agreement to mean. rrhe error of the
court did not stop there, however. The court also allowed
(over objection of counsel for appellant) :Mr. Holbrook,
one of the respondents, to testify: ( 1) that the attorney
who drew the Agreement had assured him before drawing it that it would be provided that in case of default of
the buyers, sellers could retake the land and the chickens
~H. 138, rrr. 122); (2) that Holbrook told the attorney
that the agreement would have to provide that the buyers
should maintain 8000 hens but that they could sell culls
and replace them (R. 138, Tr. 122). l\Irs. Holbrooi(, the
other respondent, was allowed to testify what was said
at a time prior to the execution of the Agreement respecting ( 1) the right of the sellers to repos:-wss the
property in case of default by buyers (R. 158, rrr. 143) ;
(2) right of buyers to sell and replace chickens and Uwt
the land and the chickens would remain the property of
the sellers (R. 159, Tr. 144-); (i3) and that there was no
(liscnssion respectin.'.!.' S(']>Hratin.'.!,' th(• (•hi('k<·ns from the
land (R. 160, Tr. 140).
~rhe

admission of the testimony of Barker set out
under Point III and the testimony of the respondentB. _Mr.
and ~Irs. Holbrook, set out above, violated the Parol 1 1 ~\'i
(lence Hule because the testimony changed and nullified
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the terms of the integrated contract between the parties.
rrhis was error. Erickson v. Bastian, 98 Utah 587, 102
P. 2d 310.

There are no terms in the contract which arc

ambiguous and which need extrinsic evidence to explain
Paragraphs 16 and 17 of, the Agreement which

them.
~Ir.

Barker was allowed to explain are identical with

provisions appearing in the l.Jniform Real Estate Contract which has been widely used in this Btate for years
by real estate brokers and lawyers.

Can it now be

~aid

that the meaning of the terms in those paragraphs such
as "convey," "premises," and "property" are now ambiguous and extrinsic testimony is needed to interpret
them!

te~tii\

For example, ::\I r. Barker was allowed to

that the word "premises" appearing in Paragraph 16
nwant both land and chickens (and presumably the other
personal property sold under the Agrerment).

Can the

word ''premises'' which for yrars has· been accepted by
1aw~·ers

to refer to real property now become ambiguous

:1nd therefore

.in~tify

<.>vidence that

"prrmi~c·s"

the conrt in allowing testimony in
means chickens, and pre:::mm-

:t bl~-

also a .irl'p, trailer, mill, c>gg grader,

~·t~Pd

mixPr a11<l motor and electric pnmps:

no1!

rg~:

eleancr,

Certainl~

Ht•spondt>nts are S<'c>king· to find an mnhiguity

when• 1lwn• is none.

This conrt in Buthrauft r. :··iitrcr

Kiuq Trest. Jli11. olid .llill. Co ..

~).)

l·tah

~~~1,

80 P.

~d ;j~18,

\'1<11 I'd:

''ln :-mpport. of tlw

i'ir~t

theory mC>utioned,
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plaintiffs haYe recourse to many matters beyond
the face of the deed itself. This is not permissable
unless the intent and meaning of the deed is 'Upon
its face uncertain or obscure. In determiniug intent, we are restrained to the language empl~yed
-to the chosen vehicle of the thought and pur}Jose
of its author. If the meaning is clear, we may not
resort to extraneous aids to interpret, modify, add
to, or subtract from its meaning. To do so would
be to assume the function of making contracts for
the parties under the guise of interpretation, a
power not delegated to the courts." (Italics added).
A similar statement was made by this court in Sf ar-

ley

v. ])('Sr'1'ef

Foods f1orp., 93 Ftah :J77, 74 P.

~d

1:2:21:

''Courts have been quite rr~Hl~· to open tlw case
to parol evidence to explain the intention of the
maker where there is anything u11 the .fare of f li ('
1/fdt gi r'ing ris(' to ambigtttity.
This view is well indicated by the cases cited h!· appellant. But wlh·n~
there is no ambiguity, the rule will not be relaxed.
The intention of the parties must he gathered from
the instrument itself. Any other rule would tend
to destroy the value of written instruments.'' (citin.!!." rasPs). (Italics added).
The faet. of the matt<·r is that no prm·ision was m~Hl<>
in the contract for tltc• sellers, n·spondPnts hPrein, to r<>tain title to tlw chickens, and h<•IH'<' nnd<·r S<•e. G0-2-3,
l".C.A.

1!);"");~,

AgTPc·mc•I!L

title pass('<l to hu:r<•rs upon

<~xpc•ui iou

of the

Respondents an• <>n<l<~avoring to gin· an

integTatecl H.'~T<·<·ment a meaning c·ompl<'t<'l)· aliPu

to

:m:·thin.~· its wonls can possibly <'Xpr<'Sf' in order to de-
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f cat the provisions of 60-2-3.

Even if appellant were to concede that the terms and
provisions of the Agreement are ambiguous as to when
title of the chickens was to pass, it would avail the respondents nothing for Rule 1 of Sec. 60-2-3 provides that
unless a different intent appears, title passes when the
In Ileatll r.

r.

S., 209 F.2d 318, the
court stated: that ''If the actual intent of the parties is
ambiguous,'' resort should then be made to the rules of
presumption found in [iniform Sales Act See. 19, which
is our Sec. 60-2-3. TVillisfon on Sales, ReY. Ed., Vol. :2,
~ec. 261, Pg. 9, states in discussing the question of intent ion of the pa rtirs as to when title passes:

eontract is made.

'By intention in this connection is meant in
the law of sales as throughout the lav~~ goYerning
the formation of contracts, expressed intent. This
is indicated by the proYisions of Ser. 18 ( :2) ( oi the
1~niform Sales Art. Sec. no-:2-:2 r.C.~\. 1953). Partie:-~ should not be allowed to tP~tifY as to their
mental ii~tentl:", but nwn·l~- as to what they said and
did .. , (citing C:lses).
rrlw :-;nmt' rule
,\I as:-~.

10,

\\"<l:-1

~Ylwre the

\H'll

ronrt

stated in Fo."frT

1'. Uoj)I'S,

111

:-~aid:

"In all c:l~t'~. howe\·er, tlw intPnt nf tlH' partlL'::-ns to wht'll the titlt' i~ to pas~ can be a~cl'rtnilll'll
rilil,IJ fronl flu· terms of flu' Of/I'!'CIIII'Jd a." C.rJlr1'8S<'rf
iu tlic lailrJitape and eowlnet of the partil'S, mid a::-;
applit><l to known n:-~ag·e and the snhjeet tnatter. lt
11111~1 lw Innnif<-'stcrl at the tinw tht' bargain is nuule.
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The rights of the parties under the contract cannot be affected by their undisclosed purposes, or by
their understanding of its legal effect." (Italics
added).
St•t• the later ease of Jilfrray r. ludursky, 266 l\[ass.

220, 165 X. E. 91, citing with approval the above rule
from Fostl'r r. Ropes.
Clearly, there was no ambiguity in the contrae! to
he interpreted and extrinsic
~[rs.

testimon~'

of Barker, Mr. and

Holbrook, set out above, was erroneously admitted

and considered hy the court in construing the Agreement.
The trial judge

b~·

his consideration of this improperly

admitted tt•stimm1~·, CQmpletely disregarded the provisions of our Sales Aet ( N(•<·s. 60-2-2 and 60-2-3) as to
when title pass(•s.

v.
The Agreement gave the Buyers the right to sell the
chicker:s and the Sellers cannot therefore object to the Appel-

hnt's mortgage which was given for value.

Assumin,:.!,' for til<' )Jill'JIOs<·s of our argument under
this point that the (•ontrad proYidPs for tlw retention of
title to th<• ehiekPns and replacements hy the sellers, it
was admitted h~· n•sfHHHlPnts ht>low 1hat tlH· <·on1rae1
ga\·e the huy(•r t]H· right to re-sell the chickens. Certainly in view of this authorization by th<· sellPrs, they could
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not object had Barker sold the chickens to a purchaser
for value .. The sellers could

~ave

that which they had authorized.

no ground to object to
We contend that ap-

pellant was a purchaser for value and that the respondents can no more object to his mortgage than they could
had he purchased them from Barker for cash.
While in this State we have not adopted the Uniform
Conditional Hales Act, an exa~ination of that Act and
decisions under it respecting the question here involved

Sec . .9 of the U. C. 8. A. provides that

will be helpful.

where the conditional seller

~xpressly

or

impliedl~T

con-

sents to the re-sale of the property, the reservation of
title shall be void against a purchm:;er from tlw

bu~rer.

\\'" c sc>t out that seetion in fnll:
"\Vhere goods are deliYered under a eonditional sale contract and the ~eller expressly or impliedly consents that the hu!Ter may resell prior to
the performance of the condition, the reservation
of property shall be Yoid against purchasers trom
the buy·er for value in the ordinary eourse of businrss, and as to them the buyer shall be deemed the
owner of the goods, even though the contract or a
eopy thereof ~hall he filed according to the provisions of thi~ net.''
In Tdilf'nOff
Nupp. :2<1 R7:->, it
. \. :1
JIO

n1ortgnp;re

~tnwli11p;

1'.

W:l~

Jacobs. :2()7 .\pp. Div.

lwl<l that nndf'r

wn~ n

~l'<'. !)

~)()8,

of the

4G ).;, Y.

r. (_ '. S .

"pnrehasrr" and tlw :-;eller had

to ob.ird to hi~ nwrtg-ag-r·.
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This court in Pedcral Laud Bank of Berkell'y v. Puce,

87 Utah 156, 48 P. 2d 480, held that a mortgagee was a
·'purchaser" within the meaning of our recording statutes respecting real property.
An illuminating case on the question here involved is
Srlzocufelds h'tawlard Puru. Co. u. Sfoe, 173 Wash. 201,
~~

P.

~~J

31)-J.,

~where

thl' conditional vendor of furniture

impliedly consented to the resale of the furniture by the
conditional vendee, and then attempted to defeat the
rights of the

~nbpurchasers.

Said t}_le court:

"Appellant (vendor) further contends that the
respondents (subpurchasers) did not rely upon an;·
act or omission on the part of the appellant, but
that, ha\·ing made a,n independent, ;·d complete,
search of the reconJ.~, and having faih•d to a~ec·r
tain the true ~tate· of title, it was their HegligPnec
that oeeasi·;lJt•<l til< loss. It rna:· he emH·Pdt>d tlmt
respondents did1nt g:o to tl!<' <>XtL>nt of pxamina·timJ
and inquiry that prudent JH'l"~ons would ordiwu·il:·
be called upon to ex<>r<'i~<'. But that, W<' think~ i~
IH·sidt• the point h<·r<·. If, as tlw <·onrt lJCid, tlte appellant conferred authority for the sale of tl1<> furniturC' to respond<·His, it wonl<l he immaterial wlwt
the records sh(~WP<l. ~ he mere I' ad 1hat t liP titlt- or
interest of thr· en" in posses~io11 of p<·rsonal propertv is (·\·i<l<·lH'<·d l>v a <·onclitional :-ml<·s <·ontrad ot'
rec~rd would not <~ff<'d t hP right of such JH•r;-;on~
to sell the property if, as a mat 1<·r of fad IH· ha~ <H'·
tnal or implied authority to sell it; tlw authorit:·
to sell such property impli<·s the expectation Ow t it
will lH· sold, and also implies the anthorit:· to pass
title to it if it is sold.''
1

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

ao
vVe submit that the above statement by the Washington court is sound.

A conditional vendor cannot on

one hand give authority to his conditional vendee to sell,
and then, on the other hand, raise an objection to .the sale.
Appellant should be entitled to the same protection of the
rule since, as we have seen, he was a purchaser for value.
lie took his chattel mortgage when approximately $3700
\Vas owing to him by the Barkers, and upon the strength
of the mortgage, allowed Barkers credit up to about
$8000.00.

As pointed out
<·

b~-

the \Vashington court, ap-

pellant is entitled to prevail regardless of ·what notice
he may have had of the contract between Hollands and
Barkers.

Had appellant fully read the Agreement be-

tween Holbrooks and Barkers, he could haYe only learned
the Barkers had the authority to re-sell ,,·hieh, as we
l~n,·r

seen, includes the authority· to mortgage.

rrh0 Snpreme < mut of California in Rm·t-lr nod
1

!Jt.fllllHT

ro. r. Bmwly. 192

~al.

180,

~1 !1

Pae.

-t-:1~. ~tated:

''But pa~·ment 1~ of little importanee wlwn
from thf~ face of the instrument it appears that the
parti0~ intended to pass title irrespecti,·e of pa~-
ment. rl1 ln1s where the owner g·i,·l:.s to the buyer the
right to re~Pll, anrl nothing i~ said in the agreement
:1~ to the tim<.' when title should pa~~. the rnlt' i~
that title pa~~0s with the exerution of the in~trn
ment, or at len~t when the time arri,·l~R when the
hn~'('J' i~ in a pn~ition to l'l'~l'll, lweansr the rig·ht to
l'<'srll pn'~nppns<'R the <.'xistrnre of a title which the
bn~·<'r ran pas~ to the new pnrrh:1ser. ( eit i11_g· rH:-;P~).
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:n
Plaintiff believes that the question of notice is not
material to the issues in this case. While the record disdoses only that he had notice of the fact there was an
agreement, but had not seen it, let us assume the plaintiff
had reaq it and had notice of the contents. In that eveut,
the plaintiff has notice of what!

~[a~'

we answer in that

event he had notiee that the ecmtrad had no tith•-retaining provisions respecting the chickens and did not re:-;ciTe title to replacements of chickens originally sold, all
of which points have been heretofore argued in this brief.
1

(

Crtainl~·

the plaintiff did not han• notice of oral under-

:-;tawling·s, sc·erl't or 11llPX}n·esse<1 constructions or interpretations.
Viewed in the light most faYorahle to the defc·m1ants,
Barkers

mort.~·ag't·d

to tll<· plaintiff whate\·c•r inh•rest he

had. in the chickens <lc•s<"rilJP<l in thP mortgage• and he
had title to the repl<H·c·nw11ts.

Plaintiff haYing notice• of

the a!.!,Tc·c·m<·nt, had noti<"<' that Barkers had a legal titlP

to the chickens which

th<·~·

mortg·H.!.!.'<•<l to him.

Should th<· judgm<'llt of t h<· trial <'011rt lH· sustained,

it will

han~

the n·snlt that the dc•fpndants sold l'Pal uncl

}J<•rsmwl prolH'rt)·, inelndin_•.!,· 8181 chickens, for a sum al~ost

c·qual to *;)0,000.00, n·c·.<·i,·ing a down payme11t of

approximately t h n•<'-fonrtlls of that amount, plus some
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additional payments, and then recover all of the real
property and certain trucks and 4000 chickens which are
replacements and not the original chickens for an additional $5500.00 (Tr. 106, R. 122) which they paid to a
bank on a G. I. loan and mortgage. At the same time, this
plaintiff stands a loss of approximately $8000.00. As a
matter of _equity, it may also be observed that had the
plaintiff not extended credit to Barkers and supplied
feed, there would have been no chickens left because
Barker had exhausted his credit and had reached the
end of the rope (Tr. 29, 71-73; R. 85, 87-89).

Of neces·

sity, Barker would have had to dispose of the chickens.
Plaintiff respectfully submits that the judgment of
1-he trial court should be re,~ersed and plaintiff should
have judgment for the chickens involved in this action or
thr valne thereof.
Res /)f'r-tfully sub m iff('d,
CLTxE, \Y n~;;;ox .t CLr~ E,
.\XII

C. Ilo"\'i'F.,
for Ploilltiff and .~ppcllaut.
RrcHARD

_.·ltforn,·y ..;
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